NIETZSCHE AGAINST PAUL

Caravaggio, Conversione di Saulo, 1600-1601 (second version).

Nietzsche against Paul,

The inventor of Christianity [1]

Allan Davy Santos Sena

Doctoral student in Philosophy at Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Unicamp),

São Paulo, Brazil.

Scholar of CNPq (National Counsel of Technological and Scientific Development) (allandavy@hotmail.com)

In a fundamental article for the Nietzsche-Forschung, Jörg Salaquarda made a somewhat audacious assertion: “If Nietzsche comes to speak of the great representatives and promulgators of the values of décadence, then he chiefly names Socrates and the ‘founder of Christianity’ (i.e., Jesus or Paul; ultimately, Paul alone). In the end Paul apparently became more important for Nietzsche than Socrates – this, at least, seems unmistakable to me.” [2] In fact, even though the confrontation with Socrates, pointed as the great symptom and instrument of dissolution inside the Greek culture since de The Birth of Tragedy, do not decrease in intensity at the last period of Nietzsche’s production (as testified by the section “The problem of Socrates” in The Twilight of the Idols), the author of Zaratustra seems, however, to be firmly convinced, at The Antichrist, of the role much more decisive that Paul has played for the consolidation of the décadence’s values in the Western world. That’s because, in Nietzsche’s view, Paul was not only the author of a décadent movement restricted to a determinate culture, but rather the one who managed to aggregate and synthesize all the fundamental characteristics of the great décadents movements of the Western world and of the Eastern world of the Antiquity, included the movement promoted by Socrates, in a single one movement, a cosmopolitan, universal movement, which do not belongs to any specific nation – namely, the Christianity, and are precisely the values propagated by this religion that have sustained the Western culture for more two millenniums.

Nevertheless, it seems that little importance has been given to the interpretation that Nietzsche does of Paul [3], and the audacity of the above mentioned declaration of Salaquarda appears under a brighter light, when one put in relief the fact that a “saint”, “apostle”, religion founder, could assume in the thought of a philosopher, more importance than Socrates. It appears that, in this case, there is a great fear that the philosopher’s “seriousness” could be thrown into doubt. Mainly when is in The Antichrist that the criticism of Paul acquires its most effusive expression. The Antichrist, a book whose intensity contained in his speech has long been seen as a symptom of the delirium that preceded the mental collapse suffered by Nietzsche a few months later the conclusion of the book. [4]

In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche evaluates his own historical importance as a transvaluator of all values. This same importance, Nietzsche confers to Paul, considered by the philosopher as the transvaluator of the noble values in favor of the décadence values [5], and the one who divided the history into before and after him in the most radical form. As clarified by Salaquarda:

If it is in Christianity that the life-hostile morality of décadence receives especially clear expression, and if it has shown itself in this form to have been a factor in history such as no other, then it is understandable that the ‘revaluator’ Nietzsche viewed Paul, the ‘inventor’ of Christianity, as one of his great adversaries, and finally as the great adversary. [6]

Therefore, for a transvaluation of all values, which will supplant the décadence values and establish new life-affirming values, can be conducted, is necessary to demolish the fundaments of the religion invented by the transvaluator Paul. Nietzsche sees the “13^th apostle” as the one who invented the Christianity precisely because he was chiefly responsible for the falsification of what represented the life and especially the death of Jesus, forging thus the figure of Christ or the Crucified One. Hence, when the philosopher concludes his Ecce Homo with a sentence that seems to contain the abbreviation of his entire philosophical project, that is: “Have I been understood? Dionysus against the Crucified One…” [7], he is not referring, as claimed Karl Jaspers [8], to Jesus, but only to the symbol created by Paul, i.e to the Crucified One, to the dead Christ on the cross for the remission of sins of mankind, the maximum expression of the denial of life and of the vital values, the higher result of this big act of falsification and corruption of a original symbolism, that is the reality lived by Jesus.    

If Nietzsche confers to Paul the authorship of the symbol of the Crucified One, and if he refers to himself as “the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus” , then it is possible to affirm that in the formula “Dionysus against the Crucified One”, what is being opposed are two antagonistic transvaluations: that one which must occur on behalf of the values of the life ascending by means of the transvaluator Nietzsche, and, in the other hand, that other which occurred on behalf of the values of the life in declining by means of the transvaluator Paul. Therefore, the sentence that closes Ecce homo and that synthesizes the philosophical project of Nietzsche could also mean: “Nietzsche against Paul.”

***

In The Antichrist, Nietzsche argues that when the history of Christianity in fact began, was not given any importance to the teachings of Jesus; from the start all the attention was turned to his death on the cross: “– The catastrophe of the evangel was decided with the death – it was attached to the ‘cross’...” [9] It was from this death and from the attempt to seek an explanation for its meaning, that the evangelium, that is, the experience of beatitude lived by Jesus, was gradually concealed and adulterated, at first, by the apostles and by the primitive community, and later, by Paul. With the “Apostle of the Gentiles” the idea of Jesus’ death as a sacrifice definitely corrupts the natural sense of what represents the life of Jesus, i.e the possibility that the décadence affirm its own conditioning and follow its natural course towards its dissolution, not seeking the conservation at all costs, not more representing, thus, a threat to the elevation of life. As Nietzsche claims:

On the heels of the “glad tidings” came the very worst: those of Paul. In Paul was embodied the opposite type to that of the “bringer of glad tidings”: the genius in hatred, in the vision of hatred, in the inexorable logic of hatred. How much this dysangelist sacrificed to hatred! Above all, the Redeemer: he nailed him to his own cross. The life, the example, the doctrine, the death, the meaning and the right of the entire evangel - nothing remained once this hate-inspired counterfeiter realized what alone he could use. [10]

According to Nietzsche, Paul was far from an idiot like Jesus. In fact, to the philosopher, the apostle was a genius. [11] In Assorted Opinions and Maxims, Nietzsche offers a concise definition of what it means to be a genius: “– To want a higher goal and the means to achieve it”. [12] Since the aphorism 68 of Daybreak, entitled “The First Christian” [13], Nietzsche argues that the great goal of Paul was always the power: “– His need was for power; in Paul the priest wanted power once again”. [14] His geniality lies in the fact that he found the most effective way to get power by means of the intuition of a powerful idea, of an original thought. To Nietzsche, this intuition has always been linked to the experience of Damascus, that Paul has been in fact taken by such a vision, it’s a different question [15], nevertheless, was through this report that Paul sought to justify his authority as an apostle as well as the veracity of his main decoy, therefore the key to understanding his enterprise is located in this decisive moment. The great idea of Paul is a interpretation of what meant the death of Jesus on the Cross, as is shown in this fragment: “On the Psychology of Paul. The fact is the death of Jesus. What remains is to interpret it...” [16] The life, the meaning of the life and of the teachings of Jesus were never part of Paul concerns, he never needed this: “At bottom, he had no use at all for the life of the Redeemer – he needed the death on the cross and a little more...” [17] However, this great idea of Paul was analyzed by Nietzsche with a certain difference of emphasis in Daybreak and The Antichrist.

In the aphorism 68 of Daybreak, the great idea of Paul, his medium to obtain the power, is understood by Nietzsche through the formula: Christ on the cross as the destruction of the Law. This first explanation of the great idea of Paul made ​​by Nietzsche was strongly influenced by Hermann Lüderman’s work Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus. [18] Nietzsche was particularly interested in the thesis of Lüderman that says that, according to Paul, there’s no possibility of salvation through the law – here’s his big axiom. Around this thesis are concentrated the extracts from Lüdermann’s book made by Nietzsche. [19] Thereafter, the philosopher develops a series of reflections [20], in which he, turning away from Lüdermann, concludes that Paul found the solution to the character unfulfillable of the Law in the dead Christ on the cross, in the destroyer of the Law.

However, during the elaboration of The Antichrist, Nietzsche comes into contact with new sources, mainly Féré [21], Wellhausen [22], Tolstoy [23], Dostoevsky [24], Jacolliot [25] and Brochard [26], and also re-read Renan [27] and Lang [28], and provided with various results of these readings, the philosopher offers a new approach to the consequence that Paul took from the death of Jesus and especially from his post-death: the apparition of the “resurrected Christ” revealed to him – at first place – the immortality of life; based on this, the apostle came to understand that the death on the cross meant the remission of sins of humanity and the possibility of “eternal salvation”. The whole doctrine of Paul stems from this fundamental assumption, from which derives the need for “expiation”, “sacrifice”, “salvation”, “judgment”, “punishment” and “retribution”. [29] With the preaching that is need, above all, faith in Christ as Savior to obtain the salvation of the soul, Paul creates a whole theology that departs radically from what Jesus actually taught, i.e, that it is only through the practice of nonresistance and unconditional love that one can achieve the bliss, which is located in within, in the kingdom of God as a condition of the heart. [30]

Mainly influenced by Tolstoy, Nietzsche goes on to identify the doctrine of personal immortality the great medium intuited by Paul for getting the power he so craved. With this belief in another life, he managed to attract the whole mass of disgruntled and disinherited of the ancient world. He managed to thereby form a real agglomerate of degenerates that, eventually, would take possession of the Roman Empire. What he needed most was proper symbols to lure the disinherited of the ancient world and bring them together under his aegis. As Nietzsche explains:

Paul wanted the end, consequently he also wanted the means. What he himself did not believe, the idiots among whom he threw his doctrine believed. [...] – he could use only concepts, doctrines, symbols with which one tyrannizes masses and forms herds. What was the one thing that Mohammed later borrowed from Christianity? Paul’s invention, his means to priestly tyranny, to herd formation: the faith in immortality – that is, the doctrine of the “Judgment”... [31]

Therefore, for Nietzsche, the great achievement of Paul was to elaborate a décadent movement on a universal scale. Paul managed to promote a fateful second encounter between East and West, which gave rise to a décadent colossal movement, one that became hegemonic and single establisher of values in the Western world, making that the décadence, which is a natural phenomenon, started to become a threat to life itself. The first encounter between East and West took place in Greece: a barbaric god, savage and uncivilized, Dionysius, with the capacity to abolish the hellenism itself, was calmed down when he allied himself with Apollo, being, thus, assimilated by the Tragedy in Greek culture, the highest point of this civilization. However, Paul promotes a second meeting, whose main result is the symbol of the Crucified One, under this symbol all the great décadents movements of the ancient world recognize each other and gather itself together: the Jewish, Hellenistic and pagan decay. Christianity is, strictly speaking, what resulted from the union between décadent East – namely, priestly Judaism and degenerated asceticism –, and décadent West – i.e. post-Socratic philosophy and degenerate paganism, the underground cults of mysteries belonging to lower strata of society. Both in décadent Greek philosophy as in degenerated paganism, a belief in the afterlife, in the salvation of the soul, was already fully developed, what remained to Paul was reinterpret it and incorporate it into his priestly Judaism and his degenerated asceticism. “This was his moment at Damascus: he comprehended that he needed the belief in immortality to deprive ‘the world’ of value, that the concept of ‘hell’ would become master even over Rome – that with the ‘beyond’ one kills life…” [32]

            Among the décadent movements that most contributed to the rise of Christianity, are the subterranean cults, symptoms of decay within paganism itself, something already fully infiltrated within the Roman Empire, though kept under control by it, but that, with the new symbols of Christianity brought by Paul, eventually supplanted the Empire. [33] Nietzsche maintains that the main reason for the decline of paganism and Hellenism was not their “corruption”, i.e. their moral perversion, but exactly the opposite, namely the introduction of morality into its bosom.[34] It may be possible to draw a trajectory for this movement of dissolution within Paganism having as a starting point the introduction of elements of Zoroastrianism within the mystery cults, as well as elements of what Nietzsche calls “egyptism”, i.e., the doctrine of judgment, punishment, reward and salvation of the soul that was transported to the initiation rituals of underground cults, what began with the Orphism. It is probable that the cult of Dionysus had already been infected by this moral disease. This is also the first time when the practice of asceticism stemmed from Asia was denaturalized [35], previously a way for the neophyte find his place in the vastness of the universe, now transformed into a practice of denial and escape from the world. This movement takes on a new aspect in the Pythagorean school, passing by Parmenides and leading to, of course, Plato, “this anti-Hellene and Semitic from instinct...” [36] The underground cults propagated in ancient Rome represented, therefore, the decline of paganism, and was it what Paul led to his Christianity. In fact, with his doctrine of salvation of the soul by the faith in Christ [37], by the faith in the forgiveness of sins by the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, he managed to overcome all the mystery cults, thus eliminating any competition. [38]

Besides the pagan décadence, another key element for the development of the Christianity of Paul was the use of the “ill reason”, i.e. post-Socratic philosophy. “The appearance of the Greek philosophers after Socrates is a symptom of décadence: the anti-Hellenics instincts take the lead.” [39] As well as Greek dialectic, other element of corrosion of the Hellenic culture that Christianity has inherited was the Platonic philosophy [40], corrupted since its birth by Pythagoreanism. Despite the use of Platonic philosophy by Christianity have acquired its definitive form in the works of Church Fathers, the direction that made ​​Christianity a “Platonism for ‘the people’” had already been given by Paul. [41]

            The unprecedented falsification of reality elaborated by Paul has as main result the symbol that expresses the absolute negation of life and all aspects that condition life itself: the Crucified One. In the symbol of the Crucified, in the vision of Christ, the “firstborn of God”, dead on the cross for the sake of humanity, all unsuccessful and poorly formed see the consecration of his weakened, wretched and miserable state: “– God on the cross – are the horrible secret thoughts behind this symbol not understood yet? – All that suffers, all that is naileid to the cross, is divine...” [42] On the death of Christ on the cross, pain and suffering are deified as means of salvation, as getaway vehicles from the world, but, as such, must be seen at the same time as the very refutation of life, rather than be its condition.

Against this ominous symbol, Nietzsche will oppose the symbol of the pagan god Dionysus. [43] In the last phase of Nietzsche’s thought, the symbol of the god Dionysus is closely related to the notion of Dionysian affirmation of life. [44] The Dionysian becomes increasingly the manifestation and the acceptance of the only existing reality. To say Yes unconditionally, unlimitedly and unshakably to life, to all its aspects, to everything that she has to offer, especially to pain, suffering and death, because these are not negative factors, but the very condition by which life might be effective. This absolute affirmation of life is contained in the figure of Dionysus, the god who comes from the most authentic pagan religious sentiment. [45]

The symbol of the Crucified One, on the other hand, was created by Paul as an attempt to overcome the subterranean cults, in which the myth of hero, of the childish-god, dead and risen, was one of the main elements of the mysteries of initiation. Therefore, the symbol of the crucified born as an attempt of answer, as a depravity and an imitation of the symbol of Dionysus. [46]

The practice of Jesus and the Christian doctrine, though radically different in their needs and in their consequences, should be more correctly designated by the word “Heilligen” (save, heal) and not by “Erlösung” (redeem, set free). There is a high probability that the German word “Erlösung” and his radical “lösen” are directly connected with “Liber” [liberator], one of the Roman names for Dionysus, so identified because of an association with Liber Pater, an ancient Italian god of agriculture. Was under this shape that Dionysus was generally celebrated in the Roman mystery cults. The popularity of his cult was great among the slaves, because of his attribute as “that one which liberates”. Dionysus was identified as Liber among the Romans, on the other hand, due to his representation in the Greek mystery cults in the shape of Lusios (or Lusos), whose name has its origin in the word “Λυσει” (Lusei), which means precisely “to resolve”, “release”, “liberate”, from which derives “Λυσό” [Lusos or Lysos], “liberator”. [47] Similarly, the German term “lösen” can mean “to loosen”, “solve”, “dissolve”, “unfasten”, “unlace”, “annul”. That is, “lösen” means, in general, to give a solution, solve a problem or a contradiction, by means of the dissolution, of the annulment of it. The Erlösung Dionysus, i.e. that who is evoked in the last writings of Nietzsche, would be the one who liberates the [highest type of] man of the great terror of existence by dissolving the contradictions inherent to it, or by nullifying the dichotomies, showing the need of pain, suffering and death for life, even better, showing that pleasure and pain, suffering and happiness, life and death belong together, are inseparable, one aspect determines other and this makes possible the existence. Erlöser, Erlösung, erlösen, in German, also refers to a double movement: to gather and disperse, to create and destroy at the same time. So the idea of a Dionysian redemption is opposed to the Christian “redemption” [48], as this eliminates, in the name of Heaven, this double movement. While the Christian “redemption” supposes the “eternity”, Dionysian redemption assumes the permanence of the becoming.

The symbol of the Crucified One is thus a corruption, a distortion, an inversion of the symbol of Dionysus. It’s like a caricature for propaganda purposes, as a parody of an most original symbol, that the symbol of the Crucified One was invented, as a manifestation of a second encounter between East and West, that this time occurred between the décadents layers of society, and not among the strongest like occurred in tragic Greece. Paul invented his own god, i.e. the Crucified One, through a kind of reverse copy of the god Dionysus. This allows us to better understand the scope of the opposition expressed in the formula Dionysus against the Crucified, or even better: – Nietzsche against Paul.

           

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[1] This text is a summary of the research project that I am currently developing as a partial requirement for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy.

[2] Salaquarda, Jörg. “Dionysus versus the Crucified One: Nietzsche’s understanding of the Apostle Paul”. In: Conway, Daniel (ed.). Nietzsche: critical assessments. Londres/Nova York: Routledge, 1998, p. 275.

[3] The major exception to this has been the work of Daniel Havemann in his book Der ‘Apostel der Rache’ (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002); and in his article “Evangelische polemik: Nietzsches Paulusdeutung” (in: Nietzsche-Studien. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, Band 29, 2000, pp. 175-186).

[4] An interpretation outdated since the seminal work of Salaquarda, “Der Antichrist” (Nietzsche-Studien. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, Band 2, 1972, pp. 91-136); and called into question brilliantly most recently by the work of Souladié (cf. “Présentation: L’Inversion contra la Volonté de puissance”. In: Nietzsche – L’Inversion des valeurs. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York : Georg Olmes Verlag, 2007, pp. 03-25). 

[5] Cf. On the Genealogy of Morals,  I, § 8; In: Nietzsche, Friedrich. Kritische Studienausgabe. Herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazino Montinari. In 15 Bänden. Berlin/München/New York: Walter de Gruyter/DTV, 1988 (from now on KSA), Band 5, p. 269. See also Salaquarda, “Dionysus versus the Crucified One”, p. 281.

[6] Salaquarda, “Dionysus versus the Crucified One”, p. 273.

[7] Cf. Ecce Homo, Why I am a destiny § 9, KSA 6, p. 374.

[8] Cf. Jaspers, Karl. Nietzsche und das Christentum. R. Piper & Co. Verlag München, 1952, p. 60.

[9] Cf. “The Antichrist”. In: The portable Nietzsche. Selected and translated, with an introduction, prefaces and notes by Walter Kaufman. Nova York: Vinking Penguin, 1982, § 41. From now on AC. KSA 6, p.213.

[10] AC § 42, KSA 6, pp. 215-216.

[11] Cf. Nachlass (posthumou fragment, from now on NL) 14 [38] spring 1888, KSA 13, p.237.

[12] Assorted Opinions and Maxims (Human, All Too Human II) § 378, KSA 2, p.526.

[13] Cf. KSA 3, pp. 64-68.

[14] AC § 42, KSA 6, p. 216.

[15] Cf. Ibidem.

[16] NL 14 [57] spring 1888 , KSA 13, p. 244.

[17] AC § 42; NL 15 [108] spring 1888, KSA 13, pp. 468-469. 

[18] Cf. Lüdermann, Hermann. Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus und ihre Stellung innerhalb seiner Heilslehre. Kiel: Universitäts-Buchhandkung, 1872. Nietzsche acquired acquaintance of this work by way of Overbeck. Cf. letters from Nietzsche to Overbeck on June 22, July 7 and July 19, 1880, In: Nietzsche, Friedrich. Sämtliche Briefe Kritische Studienausgabe. Herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazino Montinari. In 9 Bänden. Berlin/München/New York: Walter de Gruyter/DTV, 1988 (KSB), Band 6, p. 23, p. 26, p. 31.

[19] Cf. NL 4 [217], NL 4 [218] e NL 4 [219] summer 1880, KSA 9, pp. 154-156.

[20] Cf. NL 4 [220], NL 4 [231], NL 4 [253-255] e NL 4 [258] summer 1880, KSA 9, p. 156, p. 158, pp. 162-163, p. 164.

[21] Cf. Féré, Charles. Sensation et mouvement: études expérimentales de psycho-mécanique. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1887. See also Féré, Charles. Dégénéréscence et criminalité : Essai physiologique. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1888 (conserved in Nietzsche’s personal library, from now on BN, Nietzsches Bibliothek).

[22] Cf. Wellhaussen, Julius. Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1883 (BN).

[23] Cf. Tolstoï, L. Ma Religion. Paris : Libraire Fischbacher, 1885.

[24] Cf. Dostoïevsky, Th. Les Possédés. Traduit par Victor Derély. Paris: Bési, 1886.

[25] Cf. Jacolliot, Louis. Manou, Moïse, Mahomet. Paris: Librarie Internationale, 1876 (BN).

[26] Cf. Brochard, Victor. Les sceptiques Grecs. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1887 (BN).

[27] Cf. Renan, Ernest. Vie de Jésus. Paris: Calman Lévy, 1885.

[28] Cf. Lange, Friedrich Albert. Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart. Iserlohn: J. Baedeker, 1877 (BN).

[29] AC § 42, KSA 6, p. 216.

[30] Cf. AC §§ 33-35, KSA 6, pp. 205-208; AC 39, KSA 6, pp. 211-213; AC 42, KSA 6, p. 215-217; NL 10 [180], NL 10 [189], NL 10 [190], fall 1887, KSA 12, p. 563, p. 569, pp. 569-570, ; NL 11 [282], NL 11 [295], NL 11 [356], NL 11 [365], NL 11 [368], NL 11 [369], NL 11 [378], NL 11 [383] November 1887 – March 1888, KSA 13, pp. 108-109, pp. 115-117, pp. 155-157, pp. 161-162, p. 164, pp. 165-166, pp. 175-178, pp. 180-182.   

[31] AC § 42, KSA 6, pp. 216-217.

[32] AC § 58, KSA 6, pp. 247.

[33] Cf. AC § 58, KSA 6, pp. 245-247.

[34] Cf. NL 9 [22] autumn 1887, KSA 12, p. 347; NL 11 [294] November 1887 – March 1888, KSA 13, p. 114.

[35] Cf. NL 9 [93] autumn 1887, KSA 12, pp. 387-388.

[36] NL 11 [294], NL 11 [375] November 1887 – March 1888, KSA 13, p. 114, 167-169.

[37] NL 11 [281] November 1887 – March 1888, KSA 13, p. 107-108.

[38] AC § 58, KSA 6, pp. 245-247. See also Daybreak § 70 and § 72, KSA 3, pp. 68-69, pp. 70-71.

[39] NL 11 [375] November 1887 – March 1888, KSA 13, pp. 167-169

[40] Cf. Twilight of the Idols, “What I Owe to the Ancients”, § 2, KSA 6, pp. 155-156; NL 11 [294] November 1887 – March 1888, KSA 13, p. 114; NL 16 [15] spring – summer 1888; KSA 13, pp. 486-487, NL 24 [1] 8 October – November 1888, KSA 13, pp. 624-626.

[41] NL 11 [356] November 1887 – March 1888, KSA 6, pp. 155-157.

[42] AC § 51, KSA 6, p. 232.

[43] The fundamental text on this opposition, is in: NL 14 [89] spring 1888, KSA 13, pp. 265-267

[44] Cf. Twilight of the Idols, “What I Owe to the Ancients”, KSA 6, pp. 158-160; § 4; The Birth of Tragedy, “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” § 4, KSA 1, pp. 15-17.

[45] NL 14 [89] spring 1888, KSA 13, pp. 265-267.

[46] NL 11 [282] November 1887 – March 1888, KSA 13, pp. 108-109.

[47] Cf. Seaford, Richard. Dionysos. London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 29, p. 70-72, et alli.

[48] The quality of Redeemer, in the most strict reading, is attributable only to Dionysus, and not to the Crucified One or even to Jesus, the first could be only a “Savior” and the second only a savior.